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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

HILLCREST INVESTMENT COMPANY, L.L.C
Plaintiff / Appellant,
CaseNo.20110322-CA

v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT / APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court under
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)0) (West 2009). On April 15, 2011, the Utah Supreme
Court transferred this action to this Court pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Did the integrated Right of Way Contract require the Utah Department of
Transportation (UDOT) to build a frontage road as part of the consideration paid to the
Horman Family Trusts who owned the property being purchased?
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: This issue was raised in the defendant's motion
for summary judgment (R. 171-72, 868-69) and was one of the bases of the district
court's decision. R. 926.

I

\

STANDARD OF REVIEW: A grant of summary judgment is reviewed for
correctness, giving no deference to the district court's decision. Summary judgment is
appropriate only if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, 2001 UT 25, f32, 21 P.3d 198.
2. Hillcrest Investment Co. purchased the Horman Family Trusts' remaining
property some years after UDOT bought the three parcels of property it needed for the
Legacy Parkway Project. Does Hillcrest have standing to sue UDOT for alleged breaches
of UDOT's contract with the Horman Family Trusts?
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: This issue was raised in the defendant's motion
for summary judgment (R. 170, 867-68) and was one of the bases of the district court's
decision. R. 924-25.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Same as for the First Issue.
3. Did the district court err when it dismissed Hillcrest's unjust enrichment claim?
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: This issue was raised in the defendant's motion
for summary judgment (R. 174-76) and was one of the bases of the district court's
decision. R. 929-30.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Same as for the First Issue.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
There are no such statutes or rules.
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In January 2002, UDOT purchased three pa ivc I *. o( Iain! )<-« n a group of family
trusts referred to here as the Horman Family Trusts. R. 921-22. T h e p i o p n h wu

in

usedfoi tin l.t'gacy Parkway Project In November 2005, Hillcrest bought the Trusts'
remaining property adjacent to

i

Hillcrest claimed that UDOT was contractually obli*

\u\

UIIJC

the property purchased from the Trusts. On December 1, 2008, Hillcrest
filed this action a; *;

'

uicrest alleged six causes of action, asking the

court to either force UDOT to build the frontage i

-

^ n^ *> \ * niiicrest tor

failure to construct the road.1

1

UDOT I ill Ml i< Mh.ii.Hi ibrsummaryjudgmenton August 3, 2010 R 164-231, SGO77, J "he court granted UDOT's motion 11 i\ 1 -11»• 11 .s " 111 I I '' I"' »' \ I iillcrest. filed its
notice of appeal on April 4, 2011. R. 935-52. Hillcrest has not challen •:•*<•

i

of li'-i fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation claims.
STATEMENT

FACTS

The following is a verbatim restatement pf the .firsI fniirlmi ai ilu»» sixjren
paragraphs of undisputed facts as set out by the district court. R. 921-23.

1

The causes of action were for: breach of contract; declaratory judgment; specific
performance; fraudulent inducement; negligent misrepresentation; and unjust enrichment.
R 919-20
3

1. Sometime in the 1990's, UDOT announced plans for the construction of the
Legacy Parkway Project

<

2. In September 2001, following unsuccessful negotiations for the purchase of
three (3) parcels of real property located west of Interstate 15 in Centerville, Utah for the
Legacy Parkway Project, UDOT filed a condemnation action against the property's
owners: the trustees of the Namroh Trust; the trustees of the Phares T. Horman Family
Trust; the trustees of the SCV Horman Family Trust; and the trustees of the Theodore and
Birdie Horman Family Trust (collectively, the "Horman Family Trusts").
3. Hillcrest was not a party to the condemnation action, and at the time of the
condemnation action's filing, Hillcrest was not a record titleholder or lien holder of the
Horman Family Trust's property, but had invested funds for the property's development
as an industrial park.

^,^>^^^^^^^^i^

n

4. As part qf the initial negotiations and settlement negotiations regarding the
purchase of the three (3) parcels, UDOT made representations to the Horman Family
Trusts and Centerville City that its plans for the Legacy Parkway Project would include
the construction of a frontage road on the property.
5. On November 8, 2001, UDOT made an offer to settle the condemnation action,
which the Horman Family Trusts accepted.
6. In January 2002, pursuant to the condemnation action's settlement, UDOT and
the Horman Family Trusts entered Right of Way Contracts for the purchase of the three
(3) parcels.
4

i

7. The Right of Way Contracts each contain an integration clause at f 5, which
states: "The parties have here set out the whole of their agreement. The performance of
this agreement constitutes the entire consideration for the grant of said tract of land and
shall relieve [UDOTJ of all further obligations or claims on that account, or on account of
the location, grade and construction of the proposed highway,"
8. The Right of Way Contracts do not contain any reference to an obligation for
UDOT to pay for and construct a frontage road on the property.
9. The Right of Way Contracts each contain reference at f6(A) to certain
Warranty Deeds, which convey the three (3) parcels to UDOT.
10. The referenced Warranty Deeds for one (1) of the three (3) parcels states in
the property's legal description: "An undivided . . . interest in a parcel of land in fee for a
frontage road incident to the construction of a freeway known as [the Legacy Parkway
Project]."
11. UDOT paid the Horman Family Trusts the agreed purchase price for the three
(3) parcels.
12. On November 21, 2005, Hillcrest entered a Real Estate Purchase Contract for
the purchase of the Horman Family Trusts' remaining property located adjacent to the
three (3) parcels previously purchased by UDOT as part of the Legacy Parkway Project.
13. The Real Estate Purchase Contract contains the,followingrecital at ^[4:
"Whereas, [the Horman Family Trusts are] desirous of selling the Property at a

5

discounted price that properly reflects the difficulties [Hillcrest] will encounter in
developing and selling the Property to independent third parties."
14. Throughout 2006 and 2007, UDOT exchanged correspondence with Hillcrest
and Centerville City regarding the construction of a frontage road on the property
purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway Project. Ultimately the frontage road was
removed from the plans for the Legacy Parkway Project and the frontage road was not
constructed.
UDOT has agreed that Centerville City can build the frontage road after the
necessary environmental clearances are obtained and an approved development plan is in
place. R. 227-31.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Hillcrest's first three causes of action claim that UDOT breached its Right of Way
Contract with the Horman Family Trusts. It is undisputed that UDOT paid the full
contract price in exchange for receiving the three parcels of property. Hillcrest * s claims
are based on its argument that the contract also required UDOT to build a frontage road.
The integrated contract does not contain such a requirement. The unambiguous contract
only required UDOT to "[p]ay cash in full to the grantor(s)" in exchange for warranty
deeds to the three parcels of property. R. 181.

-

Hillcrest's breach of contract claims arise from a contract between UDOT and the
Horman Family Trusts. Hillcrest was not a party to the contract. Hillcrest was not in
privity to a party to the contract. Hillcrest was not an identified third-party beneficiary of
6

that contract. The district court correctly held that Hillcrest did not have standing to sue
UDOT for allegedly breaching the contract
Hillcrest's sixth cause of action was for unjust enrichment. But a prerequisite of
an unjust enrichment claim is the absence of an enforceable contract. Hillcrest has not
denied that the Right of Way Contract is an enforceable contract. An unjust enrichment
claim cannot be used to alter the contractual agreement because Hillcrest disagrees with
the deal made by the Horman Family Trusts with UDOT.
Hillcrest'sfourthand fifth causes of action sounded in tort. They were dismissed
because Hillcrest failed to file a notice of claim as required by the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. R. 926-29. Hillcrest has not challenged the dismissal of these claims in
its opening brief.
ARGUMENT
I. UDOT DID NOT BREACH ITS CONTRACT WITH THE
HORMAN FAMILY TRUSTS
Hillcrest claims that UDOT had a contractual obligation owed to the Horman
Family Trusts, and Hillcrest, to build a frontage road; that UDOT breached this duty and
should be required to either built the road or pay damages. Appellant's Brief at 21-34.
The Right of Way Contract required UDOT to pay the Horman Family Trusts a
total of $1,933,905.00 in exchange for Warranty Deeds for the three parcels of land
sought by UDOT. R. 181. The money was due upon UDOT taking possession of the
property. The contract contained an integration clause.

7

5. The parties have here set out the whole of their agreement. The
performance of this agreement constitutes the entire consideration for the
grant of said tract of land and shall relieve the Utah Department of
Transportation of all further obligations or claims on that account, or on
account of the location, grade and construction of the proposed highway.

•

Nothing in the Right of Way Contract requires that UDOT build a frontage road.
Indeed the integration clause expressly relieves UDOT of any further obligations or
claims based on how it completed the proposed highway project. The only consideration
mentioned is a sum of money. The construction of a frontage road by UDOT was not
listed as part of the consideration to be received by the Horman Family Trusts.
"When a contract includes an integration clause, the contract is presumed to
contain the whole agreement and parties may not rely on extrinsic evidence in attempting
to prove that the contract is not integrated." City of Grantsville v. Redev. Agency of
Tooele City. 2010 UT 38,^24, 233 P.3d 461. Hillcrest does not claim that the contract
was not integrated. Instead, Hillcrest claims the contract is facially ambiguous as to
whether UDOT was obligated to build a frontage road.
In arguing that the contract is ambiguous, Hillcrest relies on Daines v. Vincent,
2008 UT 51, 190 P.3d 1269, and Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Associates, 907 P.2d
264 (Utah 1995). Each case permits the use of extrinsic evidence to give meaning to
ambiguous terms, or to provide evidence that the parties gave a different meaning to a
particular phrase or term. But neither case permits a party to alter the actual terms of the
contract, or to add new terms, based on extrinsic evidence.
8

In articulating the Ward rule, we sought to establish a balanced,
"better-reasoned" approach to an analysis of facial ambiguity that would
allow judges to "consider the writing in the light of the surrounding
circumstances." Id. However, we did not intend that a judge allow
surrounding circumstances to create ambiguity where the language of a
contract would not otherwise permit. In other words, our statement that
"[rjational interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all
credible evidence," id. (internal quotation marks omitted), does not create a
preference for that evidence over the language of the contract. See Saleh v.
Farmers Ins. Exch.. 2006 UT 20. Tf 17. 133 P.3d 428 (stating that alternative
interpretations of contractual language must be supported by the usual and
natural meaning of the language used). Thus, under Ward, a finding of
ambiguity after a review of relevant, extrinsic evidence is appropriate only
when "reasonably supported by the language of the contract."
Daines, 2008 UT 51 at f27.
Hillcrest has not identified any term in the Right of Way Contract that it claims is
ambiguous. Instead, Hillcrest argues that the mention of the warranty deeds for the three
parcels of land in the contract creates an ambiguity. Namely, the deed related to one of
the three parcels states that UDOT was being given the "parcel of land in fee for a
frontage road incident to the construction of a freeway." R. 185. Hillcrest claims this
showed that part of the consideration to be provided to the Horman Family Trusts for the
sale of their property was the construction of the frontage road. The Right of Way
Contract does not mention any such consideration. The only mention of the deeds in the
Contract is in the provision stating that UDOT would:
Pay Cash in full to the grantor(s) for the following:
Land as described in Warranty Deed No. 0067:173:A
Land as described in Warranty Deed No. 0067:173
Land as described in Warranty Deed No. 0067:173:C
R. 1.81,1J6A,9

The Warranty Deeds are referenced for the limited purpose of providing the legal
description of the land being purchased by the Right of Way Contract. UDOT paid cash
for the land described in the deeds. This was the only reference to the deeds in the
contract.

\%./L:.-=

.-/-•..

This is not the kind of ambiguity that Daines and Ward considered.

,

While the Ward rule allows for the admission of extrinsic evidence
to uncover ambiguity, a finding of ambiguity will prove to be the exception
and not the rule. Our holding in Ward provides for instances, though rare,
where contractual terms are subject to alternative interpretations based on
usage. For instance, to an American, the term "boot" refers to something
you wear on your foot, but a person from Britain or New Zealand might
refer to a "boot" as the storage area in the back of a car - what Americans
would refer to as a "trunk." Likewise, in America, we get "braces" to
straighten our teeth, whereas the British use them to hold up their pants.
When contracting parties have a contrasting understanding of express terms
due to usage, the Ward rule provides the court with the ability to "place
itself in the same situation in which the parties found themselves at the time
of contracting." Ward, 907 P.2d at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted).

;

i

Daines, 2008 UT 51 at P 0 n.5.
Hillcrest asks this Court to add a new provision to the Right of Way Contract, not
to address possible alternative interpretations of the terms used. The warranty deed in
question only states the transportation purpose for which the property was being sought, a
frontage road. UDOT can only condemn private property for transportation purposes.
See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-103(1) (West 2004). Transportation purposes are defined by
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-102 (West 2004). The deeds for the other parcels of
property expressly state they are being given to UDOT, in fee, for the purposes of
building a freeway (R. 183) and "for a utility corridor incident to the construction of a
10

freeway," R. 187. The recitation of the transportation purpose for which the parcels of
property were sought does not affect the contract's clear statement of the consideration to
bepaid.
None of the deeds contains a covenant running with the land that is enforceable by
the Horman Family Trusts or Hillcrest. The deeds gave the land in fee to UDOT. There
is no restrictive covenant that retains a right in the grantors to a frontage road or any other
continuing right in the three parcels of property.
Where expressly stated, restrictive covenants are not favored in the
law and are strictly construed in favor of the free and unrestricted use of
property. Generally, express restrictive covenants are upheld only "where
they are necessary for the protection of the business for the benefit of which
the covenant was made and no greater restraint is imposed than is
reasonably necessary to secure such protection." Under certain extreme
circumstances, a restrictive covenant may arise by implication from the
language of a deed or lease or from the conduct of the parties. As a general
rule, however, implied covenants are not favored in the law. In order for a
restrictive covenant to be implied, the support for it must be "plain and
unmistakable" or it must be "necessary" as a matter of law.
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 198 (Utah 1991).
There is no "plain and unmistakable" support for the creation of a restrictive
covenant in the warranty deed. UDOT obtained fee simple ownership of the parcels of
property that it bought. The integration clause states that UDOT was relieved from all
other obligations and claims related to the construction of the proposed highway project.
If changing circumstances led to the decision not to build the freeway, that would not
violate any right of the Horman Family Trusts or Hillcrest. If the purchased parcel was
not used for a utility corridor it would not violate any right of the Horman Family Trusts
II

or Hillcrest. The same is true of the changed circumstances that led UDOT to alter its
plans for the construction of the Legacy Parkway Project and leave the construction of the
frontage road to Centerville City.
IL HILLCREST HAS NO STANDING TO SUE FOR BREACH OF
UDOT'S CONTRACT WITH THE HORMAN FAMILY TRUSTS
Hillcrest was not a party to the contract between the Horman Family Trusts and
UDOT. Indeed, Hillcrest purchased the Trusts' remaining property "at a discounted price
that properly reflects the difficulties [Hillcrest] will encounter in developing and selling
the Property to independent third parties." R. 719 (Real Estate Purchase Contract). The
district court properly held that Hillcrest did not have standing to enforce UDOT's
contract with the Horman Family Trusts.
"It is axiomatic in the law of contract that a person not in privity cannot sue on a
contract." Shire Dev. v. Frontier Inv., 799 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting
Wing v.Martin, 688 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Idaho 1984)). Only the parties to a contract, and
their intended beneficiaries, have standing to sue on a contract. Id at 222-23. In Shire,
joint venturers of a contracting party brought an action on the contract. Where the
plaintiffs were neither parties to the contract, nor assignees of the contract they lacked
standing to sue on the contract.
Hillcrest claims that it is the assignee of the Horman Family Trusts because of the
Real Estate Purchase Contract. R. 719-24. But the contract does not claim to assign any
rights in prior contracts to Hillcrest. 'This court has made clear that assignments of

12

interest in property should be stated in the contract with specificity, including the usual
words of assignment such as 'assumes,' 'agrees to pay,' 'assigns,' 'transfers' or
'conveys.'" Shire Dev., 799 P.2d at 223. No such specific assignment of any rights in
the Right of Way Contract was made.
Nor does Hillcrest's claim that it was a beneficiary of one of the Horman Family
Trusts (Appellant's Brief at 36) make it a beneficiary of the Right of Way Contract. To
be a third-party beneficiary of that contract, Hillcrest must prove that the contracting
parties clearly intended to confer "a separate and distinct benefit on Hillcrest." Wagner v.
Clifton, 2002 UT 109, %11, 62 P.3d 440 (citation omitted). Such an intent must be found
in the written contract. IcL
Hillcrest is not mentioned in the Right of Way Contract. No one is mentioned
other than the parties. Nothing in the contract gave Hillcrest standing to bring this action.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED
HILLCREST'S UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM
Hillcrest seeks relief from UDOT under the Right of Way Contract that it made
with the Horman Family Trusts. But Hillcrest also asks this Court to award damages for
unjust enrichment. An unjust enrichment claim cannot be made where a valid contract
exists. "[A] prerequisite for recovery on an unjust enrichment theory is the absence of an
enforceable contract governing the rights and obligations of the parties relating to the
conduct at issue." Ashbv v. Ashby. 2010 UT 7, If 14, 227 P.3d 246 (unjust enrichment
claims presuppose that no written or oral contract exists).

13

A claim of unjust enrichment cannot be used to enforce the Right of Way Contract.
Unjust enrichment cannot be used to reform a contract. In Dalton v. Jerico Construction
Co.. 642 P.2d 748 (Utah 1982), a subcontractor claimed that his contract was unfair and
that he was entitled to extra compensation. The subcontractor argued that the theory of
unjust enrichment should be applied. The Court rejected this argument because the
contract, and not the theory of unjust enrichment, controlled. IcL at 750. "[I]t is not for a
court to rewrite a contract improvidently entered into at arm's length or to change the
bargain indirectly on the basis of supposed equitable principles." IdL Hillcrest cannot
change the terms of the Right of Way Contract using the theory of unjust enrichment.
CONCLUSION
The district court correctly held that: UDOT had not breached its contract with the
Horman Family Trusts; Hillcrest did not have standing to bring this action; and, an unjust
enrichment claim cannot be raised where an enforceable contract exists. The dismissal of
this action should be affirmed on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this

/H*

day of November, 2011.

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant
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ADDENDUM "A

- 8 2011
SECOND

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
FARMNGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
HILLCREST INVESTMENT
COMPANY, LLC,

RULING AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

Case No. 080700723
Judge John R. Morris

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment. The
Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers, along with their supporting and
supplemental materials, and the Court's casefile.The Court also held a hearing on the matter on December 27, 2010. Having considered all of the arguments, being fully advised in
the premises, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion.
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Hillcrest Investment Company, LLC ("Hillcrest") initiated this action on
December 1, 2008, filing a complaint against Defendant Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") that alleged six (6) causes of action: (1) breach of contract regarding
UDOT's failure to construct a frontage road on certain real property purchased as part of
the Legacy Parkway Project; (2) declaratory judgment regarding UDOT's obligation to construct a frontage road on certain real property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway
Project; (3) specific performance requiring UDOT to pay for and construct afrontageroad
on certain real property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway Project; (4)fraudulentinducement pertaining to UDOT's representations that it would pay for and construct a frontage road on certain real property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway Project; (5) negligent misrepresentation pertaining to UDOT's representations that it would pay for and
construct afrontageroad on certain real property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway

Ruling and Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Case No. 080700723
Project; and (6) unjust enrichment for the reduced purchase price and severance damages
conferred on UDOT for its purchase of certain real property as part of the Legacy Parkway
Project. On December 18, 2008, UDOT filed its answer to Hillcrest's complaint denying
liability.
On August 3, 2010, UDOT filed a motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal on each of Hillcrest's claims. Specifically, UDOT argues that Hillcrest's contract
claims are barred as Hillcrest lacks any contractual privity with UDOT and because UDOT
was not obligated to pay for and construct a frontage road as part of its purchase of the
property for the Legacy Parkway Project, that Hillcrest's fraud and misrepresentation claims
are barred by Hillcrest's failure:'to file a notice of claim in compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah; and that Hillcrest's unjust enrichment claim fails as a benefit was
not conferred upon UDOT for which UDOT did not provide compensation.
Hillcrest filed its memorandum in opposition to UDOT's motion on September 10,
2010. In its opposition, Hillcrest argues that as a beneficial part-owner of the property at the
time of UDOT's purchase, Hillcrest was in privity of contract with UDOT, and that language within the warranty deeds that conveyed the property to UDOT obligated UDOT to
payforand construct a frontage road on the property as part of the Legacy Parkway Project.
Hillcrest further argues that it complied with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah's notice of claim requirement as UDOT had actual notice of Hillcrest's claims. Finally, Hillaest
argues that equity necessitates recovery for the reduced purchase price and severance damages that UDOT received when it purchased the subject properties after representing that it
would pay for and construct a frontage road on the property.
On September 29, 2010, UDOT filed a reply memorandum in support of its motion
for summary judgment reasserting its prior arguments. That same day, UDOT also filed a
request to submit its motion for decision.
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On December 27, 2010, the Court held a hearing on UDOTs motion for summary
judgment.1 At the hearing, the Court ruled that it would overlook the technical defects in
the parties' pleadings as the issues are relatively straightforward, neither party would be
prejudiced, and because judicial economy favored a determination on the motion's merits
rather than its mere refiling and rebriefing. Following argument by the parties, the Court
took the matter under advisement. Accordingly, the Court finds that briefing on UDOT's
motion for summary judgment is complete and that the matter is now ripe for determination.
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Sometime in the 1990's, UDOT announced plans for the construction of the

Legacy Parkway Project.
2.

In September 2001, following unsuccessful negotiations for the purchase of

three (3) parcels of real property located west of Interstate 15 in Centerville, Utah for the
Legacy Parkway Project, UDOTfileda condemnation action against the property's owners:
the trustees of die Namroh Trust; the trustees of the Phares T. Horman Family Trust; the
trustees of the SCV Horman Family Trust; and the trustees of the Theodore and Birdie
Horman Family Trust (collectively, the "Horman Family Trusts").
3.

Hillcrest was not a party to the condemnation action, and at the time of the

condemnation action's filing, Hillcrest was not a record titleholder or lien holder of the

Also pending at the hearing were Hillcrest's motion to strike portions of UDOT's reply memorandum and Hillcrest's motion to reconsider the Court's order denying Hillcrest's ex parte motion to file
overlength opposition memorandum.
2

Hillcrest argued in its opposing memorandum that denial of UDOTs motion is appropriate due to
UDOT's failure to separately number its statement of undisputed facts. See Utah R. Civ. P.
7(c)(3)(A). Additionally, the Court rejected Hillcrest's request tofilean overlength opposition memorandum and Hillcrest failed to subsequently file an opposition memorandum of appropriate
length See Id. at 7(c)(2).
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Horman Family Trusts' property, but had invested funds for the property's development as
an industrial park.:
4.

As part of the initial negotiations and settlement negotiations regarding the pur-

chase of the three (3) parcels, IJDOT made representations to the Horman Family Trusts
and Centerville City that its plans for the Legacy Parkway Project would include the construction of afrontageroad on the property.
5.

On November 8, 2001, UDOT made an offer to settle the condemnation action,

which the Horman Family Trusts accepted.
6.

In January 2002, pursuant to the condemnation action's settlement, UDOT and

the Horman Family Trusts entered Right of Way Contracts for the purchase of the three (3)
parcels.
7.

The Right of Way Contracts each contain an integration clause at 1f5, which

states: "The parties have here set out the whole of their agreement. The performance of this
agreement constitutes the entire consideration for the grant of said tract of land and shall
relieve [UDOT] of all

ft^

on that account, or on account of the lo-

cation, grade and construction of the proposed highway."
8.

The Right of Way Contracts do not contain any reference to an obligation for

UDOT to pay for and construct afrontageroad on the property.
9.

The Right of Way Contracts each contain reference at H6(A) to certain Warran-

ty Deeds, which conveyed the three (3) parcels to UDOT.
10. The referenced Warranty Deeds for one (1) of the three (3) parcels states in the
property's legal description: "An undivided ... interest in a parcel of land in fee for a frontage road incident to the construction of a freeway known as [the Legacy Parkway
Project]."
11. UDOT paid the Horman Family Trusts the agreed purchase price for the three
(3) parcels.
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12. On November 21, 2005, Hillcrest entered a Real Estate Purchase Contract for
the purchase of the Horman Family Trusts1 remaining property located adjacent to the three
(3) parcels previously purchased by UDOT as part of the Legacy Parkway Project.
13. The Real Estate Purchase Contract contains the following recital at 1f4: "Whereas, [the Horman Family Trusts are] desirous of selling the Property at a discounted price
that properly reflects the difficulties [Hillcrest] will encounter in developing and selling the
Property to independent third parties."
14. Throughout 2006 and 2007, UDOT exchanged correspondence with Hillcrest
and Centerville City regarding the construction of afrontageroad on the property purchased
as part of the Legacy Parkway Project. Ultimately thefrontageroad was removed from the
plans for the Legacy Parkway Project and thefrontageroad was not constructed.
15. On October 28, 2008, Hillcrest delivered a letter to UDOT's executive director
regarding Hillcrest's claims, which attached a draft of Hillcrest's complaint in this action;
however, Hillcrest did not deliver a notice of its claims to the agent that UDOT has authorized to receive notices of claims against UDOT or the Office of the Attorney General prior
to initiating this action.
16. Hillcrest commenced this action on December 1, 2008.
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entided to a judgment
as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ, P. 56(c). "Because disposition of a case on summary
judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, any doubt concerning questions of fact,
including evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, should be resolved
in favor of the opposing party." Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., ISO P.2d 827, 831
(Utah 1989).
Here, UDOT seeks summary dismissal on each of Hillcrest's claims.
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Hillcrest's Contract Claims Against UDOT (Breach of Contract, Declaratory Judgment,
and Specific Performance)
In order to survive summary dismissal of its breach of contract claim and contract
related claims, Hillcrest must show some evidence that a contract existed, that Hillcrest performed its obligations under the contract, that UDOT failed to perform under the contract,
and that Hillcrest was damaged by UDOTs failure to perform. See Bair v. Axiom Design,
L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, Tfl4, 20 P.3d 388. UDOT contends that Hillcrest was not party to, or in
privity of, any contract with UDOT, and that even if a contract or privity exists, UDOT fully performed, as it was not obligated to construct a frontage road on the property purchased
from the Horman Family Trusts as part of the Legacy Parkway Project.
'"As a general rule, none is liable upon a contract except those who are parties to
iV" Shire Dev.v.Frontier-Invs.,199 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah Ct App. 1990) (quoting County of
Clark v. Bonanza No. / r 615 P.2d 939, 943 (Nev. 1980)). "Tt is axiomatic in the law of contract that a person not in privity cannot sue on a contract.,,, Id. (quoting Wing v. Martin, 688
P.2d 1172, 1177 (Idaho 1984)). Accordingly, "only parties to a contract, or intended beneficiaries thereof, have standing to sue [on a contract]." Id. at 222-23.3
Here, it is undisputed that Hillcrest was not a record titleholder of the properties
UDOT purchased from the Horman Family Trusts for the Legacy Parkway Project, was not
party to UDOTs condemnation action against the Horman Family Trusts, was not a party

"Third-party beneficiaries are persons who are recognized as having enforceable rights created in
them by a contract to which they are not parties and for which they give no consideration." SME
Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, f!7, 28 P.3d 669 (Internal
quotations omitted). "The existence of third party beneficiary status is determined by examining a
written contract." Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, \U, 62 P.3d 440 (Internal quotations omitted).
"The written contract must show that the contracting parties clearly intended to confer a separate
and distinct benefit upon the third party." Id. (Internal quotations omitted). "Indeed, [the Utah Supreme Court] has stated that it is not enough that the parties to the contract know, expect or even
intend that others will benefit from the [contract].... The contract must be undertaken for the plaintiffs direct benefit and the contract itself must affirmatively make this intention clear." SME Indus.,
Inc., 2001 UT 54, $47 (Internal quotations omitted).
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to the Right of Way Contracts between UDOT and the Horman Family Trusts, and did not
purchase the Horman FamilyTrusts' remaining adjacent property until several years after
UDOT and the Horman Family Trusts entered the Right of Way Contracts. Additionally,
the clear and unambiguous language within the Right of Way Contracts and Warranty
Deeds conveying the purchased property from the Horman Family Trusts to UDOT contain
no reference to Hillcrest or any other potential third-party beneficiary. Accordingly, given
these facts and the plain language of the Right of Way Contracts and Warranty Deeds, the
Court must conclude as a matter of law that Hillcrest does not have standing to sue UDOT
on its contract claims, as Hillcrest was not a party to, or in privity of, UDOT's contracts
with the Horman Family Trusts.4
Moreover, even if Hillcrest was a party to, or in privity of, UDOT's contracts with
the Horman Family Trusts, the Court finds that UDOT was not obligated to pay for and
construct a frontage road on the property purchased from the Horman Family Trusts for the
Legacy Parkway Project. Specifically, UDOT's Right of Way Contracts with the Horman
Family Trusts contain a clear and unambiguous integration clause that indicates the document sets forth the parties' entire agreement. (See Right of Way Contracts, 1f5).5 The Right
of Way Contracts do not contain any reference to an affirmative or executory obligation of
UDOT to pay for and construct a frontage road on the purchased property. (See generally

The fact that Hillcrest invested funds for the development of the Horman Family Trusts' property
prior to UDOT's purchase of the property for the Legacy Parkway Project and subsequently purchased the Horman Family Trusts' remaining adjacent property is insufficient to demonstrate that
Hillcrest was in privity of contract or an intended third-party beneficiary of the contracts between
UDOT and the Horman Family Trusts. Further, Hillcrest has failed to present sufficient competent
evidence that it was a beneficiary of, or successor entity to, the Horman Family Trusts, that the
Horman Family Trusts have assigned to Hillcrest any claims they may have against UDOT, or any
other evidence to establish a privity relationship with the Horman Family Trusts or UDOT.
"An integrated agreement is defined as a writing ... constituting a final expression of one or more
terms of an agreement. When a contract includes an integration clause, the contract is presumed to
contain the whole agreement and parties may not rely on extrinsic evidence in attempting to prove
that the contract is not integrated." City ofGrantsvillev.Redev. Agency of Tooele City, 2010 UT 38, ^24,
233 P.3d 461 (Internal citations omitted).
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Id.). Further, while the Right of Way Contracts specifically reference the Warranty Deeds
that conveyed the purchased property from the Horman Family Trusts to UDOT, and the
property's legal description within the Warranty Deeds refers to a general purpose "for a
frontage road incident to the construction of a freeway known as [the Legacy Parkway
Project,]" the Court finds that this language does not modify the parties' obligations set
forth in the Right of Way Contracts and does not create an additional obligation on the part
of UDOT to pay for and construct a frontage road on the purchased property. (See Id. at
116(A); see also Warranty Deeds). Rather, the plain language of the Warranty Deeds merely
reflects that the purchased property may be used for a frontage road incident to the Legacy
Parkway Project. (See Warranty Deeds). Accordingly, despite any representations made by
UDOT during initial negotiations and settlement negotiations with the Horman Family
Trusts, and subsequent correspondence with Hillcrest and Centerville City, the Court must
conclude as a matter of law that UDOT was not contractually obligated to pay for and construct afrontageroad on the property that it purchased from the Horman Family Trusts as
part of the Legacy Parkway Project. The Court, therefore, GRANTS UDOT's motion for
summary judgment as to Hillcrest's claims for breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and
specific performance.
Hillcrest's Fraudulent Inducement and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims
Hillcrest alleges that UDOTfraudulentlyinduced settlement of its condemnation action against the Horman Family Trusts by representing that it would pay for and construct a
frontage road on the property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway Project. Hillcrest
further alleges that UDOT negligently misrepresented its intent and commitment to construct thefrontageroad as part of the Legacy Parkway Project.
"The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, establishes the parameters under which
parties may bring suit against governmental entities for injuries." Greene v. Utah Transit
Auth., 2001 UT 109, flO, 37 P.3d 1156. "Utah law mandates strict compliance with the re-
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quirements of the Immunity Act." Id. at 1fl2. Relevant to this case, the Act provides that a
notice of claim must befiledprior to the initiation of court action:
"Any person having a claim against a governmental entity, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority
shallfilea written notice ofclaim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless or whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental"
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(2) (Emphasis added). The Act further provides that "[t]he notice of claim shall be ... directed and delivered by hand or by mail according to the requirements of Section68-3-8.5to the office of: ... (E) the attorney general, when the claim is
against the state; ... or (G) the agent authorized by a governmental entity to receive the notice of claim by the governmental entity under Subsection (5)(e)." Id. at § 63G-7401(3)(b)(ii)(E) & (G).6
"'The primary purpose of a notice of claim requirement is to afford the responsible
public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of
a claim and to arrive at a timely settlement if appropriate, thereby avoiding the expenditure
of public revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation.'" Brittain v. State by & through Utah
DepXcfEmployme
TramitAuth.i6l%¥2&m^

671 (Utah Ct. App- 1994) (quoting Stahl v. Utah
"Furthermore,filingnotice of claim tends to

minimize the difficulties that may arise due to changes in administrations... [and] protects
against the passage of time obscuring memory and distorting a plaintiffs recollection of the
events which are at the heart of the claim." Id. (Internal citations omitted). Accordingly,
"the [Utah] supreme court has held the statutory notice requirement is a jurisdictional re-

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-40l(5)(a) and (e): "Each governmental entity subject to suit
under [the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah] shallfilea statement with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code within the Department of Commerce ... [and] may, in its statement,
identify an agent authorized by the entity to accept notices of claim on its behalf." Utah Code Ann.
§ 63G-7-401(5)(a) & (e). UDOT has identified Shelley Exeter as its authorized agent to accept notices of claim on its behalf.
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quirement and a precondition to suit"Lamarr v. Utah State Dep'tofTransp., 828 P.2d 535,
540 (Utah Ct App. 1992) (citing Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988)).
Here, it is undisputed that Hillaest did not deliver a notice of its claims against
UDOT to the Office of the Attorney General or the agent that UDOT has authorized to receive notices of claim prior to initiating this action. Further, while UDOT had actual notice
of Hillcrest's claims prior to the filing of Hillcrest's complaint by virtue of the October 28,
2008 letter Hillcrest delivered to UDOT's executive director, "the [Utah] supreme court has
indicated that actual notice cannot cure a failure to comply with the notice provisions of the
GovernmentalImmunity Act" Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 541 (citing Varoz v. Sevey\ 506 P.2d435,
436 (Utah 1973)). Accordingly, the Court must conclude that it is without jurisdiction to
hear Hillcrest'sfraudulent inducement arid negligent misrepresentation claims against
UDOT.
Additionally, even if Hillcrest had strictly cori^lied with the notice of claim requirement of the Governmental ImmunityAct of Utah,Hillcresfs claims for fraudulent inducement and negjigent misrepresentation are fundamental

Hillcrest's

complaint alleges that it sold property to UDOT at a reduced cost based upon UDOT's representations that it would pay for and construct afrontageroad across the purchased property as part of the Legacy Parkway Project, (See Complaint, iffl45-60). However, Hillcrest
did not convey any property to UDOT tosupport these allegations. Rather, the undisputed
facts show that Hillcrest was not a recordtideholderof the property that UDOT purchased
from the Horman Family Trusts and was not a party to UDOT's condemnation action
against the Horman Family Trusts.7 Moreover, the Court has found that Hillcrest was not
Indeed, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Hillcrest purchased the Horman Family Trusts' remaining adjacent property several years after UDOT purchased the property for the Legacy Parkway
Projectfromthe Horman Family Trusts. {See Real Estate Purchase Contract). At the time of this
purchase, it was uncertain whether afrontageroad would be included in UDOT's plans for the Legacy Parkway Project. In fact, Hillaest purchased the remaining adjacent property at a discounted
price, which reflected the difficulties Hillcrest would encounter in developing and selling the property to independent third parties. (See Id. at Recital ^i).
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party to the Right of Way Contracts between UDOT and the Horman Family Trusts, was
not in privity of contract or an intended third-party beneficiary of the Right of Way Contracts, and that Hillcrest has not presented sufficient evidence to establish that it was a beneficiary of, or successor entity to, the Horman Family Trusts, or that the Horman Family
Trusts assigned Hillcrest any claims that they may have against UDOT. Accordingly, given
the undisputed facts in this matter and the Court's rulings on Hillcrest's contract related
claims, the Court must conclude as a matter of law that Hillcrest cannot succeed on its fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation claims. The Court, therefore, GRANTS
UDOT's motion for summary judgment as to Hillcrest's claims for fraudulent inducement
and negligent misrepresentation.
Hillcrest's Unjust Enrichment Claim
Hillcrest complains that UDOT has been unjustly enriched and that equity necessitates recovery for the reduced purchase price and severance damages that UDOT received
when it purchased the property from the Horman Family Trusts upon representing that it
would pay for and construct afrontageroad on the property.
"A claim for unjust enrichment is an action brought in restitution, and a prerequisite
for recovery on an unjust enrichment theory is the absence of an enforceable contract governing the rights and obligations of the parties relating to the conduct at issue." Ashby v.
Ashby, 2010 UT 7,1fl4, 227 P.3d 246. "If there were a contract, it, rather than the law of restitution, would govern the parties' rights and determine their recovery." Id. "Recovery under [unjust enrichment] presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract exists." Id.
(Internal quotations omitted).
Here, the Court has found that no enforceable contract exists between Hillcrest and
UDOT. Nevertheless, to succeed on its claim for unjust enrichment, Hillcrest must establish
three elements:
"First, there must be a benefit conferred by one person on another. Second the
conferee must appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit. Third, there must
be acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circums-II-
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tances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without
payment of its value."
Allen v. Hall, 2006 UT 70, 1f26, 148 P.3d 939. It is undisputed that Hillcrest was never a
record tMeholder of the property UDOT purchased from the Herman Family Trusts as part
of the Legacy Parkway Project, and that Hillcrest did riot purchase the Horman Family
Trusts' remaining adjacent property until several years after UDOT and the Horman Family
Trusts entered the Right of Way Contracts. Under these facts, the Court cannot find that
Hillcrest ever conferred a benefit on UDOT to support Hillcrest's claim for unjust enrichment. Additionally, Hillcrest has presented no evidence to establish that it was a beneficiary
of, or successor entity to, the Horman Family Trusts, or that the Horman Family Trusts
have assigned to Hillcrest any claims they may have against UDOT. Regardless, however,
the Court has found that the Right of Way Contracts between UDOT and the Horman
Family Trusts do not contain any affirmative or executory obligation for UDOT to pay for
and construct a frontage road on the property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway
Project. Accordingly, the Court must conclude as a matter of law that UDOT did not receive a benefit for which it did not compensate the Horman Family Trusts upon its performance under the Right of Way Contracts. The Court, therefore, GRANTS UDOT's motion
for summary judgment as to Hillcrest1 s unjust enrichment claim.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Right of Way Contracts between UDOT and the Horman Family Trusts

are fully integrated and contain the parties1 entire agreement.
2.

The Right of Way Contracts and Warranty Deeds between UDOT and the

Horman Family Trusts are clear and unambiguous.
3.

Hillcrest does not have standing to assert its contract claims against UDOT, as

Hillcrest was not a party to any contract with UDOT, and was not in privity of contract or
an intended third-party beneficiary of UDOT's Right of Way Contracts with the Horman
Family Trusts.
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4.

UDOT's Right of Way Contracts with the Horman Family Trusts do not con-

tain any obligation, executory or otherwise, requiring UDOT to pay for and construct a
frontage road on the property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway Project.
5.

The Warranty Deeds conveying the purchased property for the Legacy Park-

way Project from the Horman Family Trusts to UDOT do not modify UDOT's obligations
under the Right of Way Contracts, and do not create an additional obligation for UDOT to
pay for and construct afrontageroad on the property.
6.

UDOT performed its obligations under the Right of Way Contracts with the

Horman Family Trusts.
7.

The Court lacks jurisdiction over Hillcrest's fraudulent inducement and negli-

gent misrepresentation claims against UDOT, as Hillcrest failed to deliver the requisite notice of claim in accordance with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah.
8.

UDOT's actual notice of Hillcrest's claims prior to the filing of Hillcrest's com-

plaint does not cure Hillcrest's failure to comply with the notice of claim requirement of the
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah.
9.

Even if Hillcrest had complied with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah's

notice of claim requirement, Hillcrest was not the record tideholder of, and could not convey, the property UDOT purchased from the Horman Family Trusts as part of the Legacy
Parkway Project, and therefore, Hillcrest cannot establish the necessary elements to support
its claims offraudulentinducement and negligent misrepresentation.
10. Hillcrest did not confer a benefit upon UDOT for purposes of Hillcrest's unjust
enrichment claim, and UDOT did not unjustly receive a benefit from the Horman Family
Trusts, as UDOT was not obligated to pay for and construct a frontage road on the property
purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway Project.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that UDOT's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
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IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that as a consequence of this ruling, all
other pending motions are rendered moot.
This Ruling shall also constitute the Court's Order in this matter; no separate order is
necessary or required.
Date signed:
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OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Thomas L. Van Wyngarden
Adelaide Maudsley
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER, LLP
201 South Main Street, Suite 2000
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RIGHT O^ WAY CONTRACT

2-2000

t h . N o . 70004
vet Name:

PPMSPinNo.

1793

Region No, 2

Legacy Parkway - So. Davis Co.

Project No. SP-0067(l)0

Parcel N o . 173:A, 173 i 173-C

The Namroh Trust, The Phares T Horman Family Trust, The SCV Honman Familty Trust,

The Theodore & Birdie Horman Family Trust Grantor(s) of

te:

See Below Warranty deed(s) for a tract of land for transportation purposes over property described in said deed will be delivered to
i J. West, SR/WA Acquisition Agent, as escrow agent, with instructions to deliver said deed(s) to the Utah Department of Transportation,
48420, 4501 South 2700 West, 4 * Floor South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-8420, upon the delivery to said escrow agent, for the undersigned
>r(s) of a copy of this agreement, properly executed and approved by the Utah Department of Transportation.
IN CONSIDERATION of the foregoing, and other considerations hereinafter set forth it is mutually agreed by the parties hereto as
s:
1. Said tract of land is grantedfreeand clear. All liens and encumbrances and partial releases for said tract of land shall be furnished to the Utah Department of
Transportation, and the total amount in cash settlement shall be paid to the grantor except such portion thereof, as the grantor may assign to a lien holder in obtaining the
lartial releases.
2. All work done under this agreement, shall conform to all applicable building, fire and sanitary laws, ordinances and regulations relating to such work, and
tall be done in a good and workmanlike manner.
3. All structures, improvements, or other facilities when removed and relocated or reconstructed, shall be left in as good condition as found.
4. No work, improvement, alteration or maintenance will be done cr rnade c>mer man or in addition to mat rjrovided in this agreement5. The parties have here set out the whole of their agreement. The performance of this agreement constitutes die entire consideration for the grant of said tract
L* land and shall reueve the Utah Department of Transportation of allfiirtherobligations or claims on that account, or on account of the location, grade and construction of
ic proposed highway.

6, If and when possession is taken by it of the said tract of land(s) hereinabove referred to, the Utah Department of
>ortation shall comply with the following:
int R, Horman, Rhys Horman & Kenneth Erickson, trustees of the NAMROH TRUST,
und-23.445410% int)
as T. Horman, Jr., Kevin Ride & Kenneth L. Spurlock, trustees of the PHARES TV HORMAN FAMILY
JST (an und. 23.079810%)
es H. Horman, trustee of the SCV HORMAN FAMILY TRUST; (an und. 30.139510%)
is Horman, trustee of the THEODORE AND BIRDIE HORMAN FAMflLY TRUST; (an und.
335270% int)
y Cash in full to the grantor(s) for the following:
Land as described in Warranty Deed No. 0067:173: A
Land as described in Warranty Deed No. 0067:173
Land as described in Warranty Deed No. 0067:173:C

$1,933,905.00

7. Grantor agrees to pay any and all taxes assessed against this property to date of closing. However a l l taxes
ri'against
t h e P r o p e r t y t o t h e d a t e o f c l o s i n g s h a l l n o t i n c l u d e any r o l l b a c k taxes or any
e i n l i e u f e e payments t h a t nay b e r e q u i r e d , a s d e s c r i b e d Total Cash Settlement $1,933,905.00
t'Code Ann. g 5 9 - 2 - 5 1 1 , A l l r o l l b a c k t a x e s and a n y o n e - t i m e i n l i e u f e e pa^fnoits s h a l l b e
f u l l s o l e l y b y t h e Utah Departirent o t T r a n s p o r t a t i o n .
year first above written, ft is understood that this is only an option until
[N VyiTNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this agreeraeat the day and year
y the Utah Department of Transportation.

,GRANT<WS) ,
EPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
fed for Appcov;

f
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APPROVAL OF CONSTRUCTION ITEMS:
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